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The Gulf Monarchies and Pacific Asia: Towards Interdependency? 
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIDSON 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A host of economic, diplomatic, cultural, and other highly pragmatic linkages 
seem to be making the long-predicted 'Asianization' of Asia a reality.
1
 As this chapter will demonstrate, the powerful and multidimensional 
connections that are being forged by the very eastern and western extremities of 
the continent are perhaps now one of the most visible indicators of this process.  
Given time, this will finally lead to the emergence of meaningful bilateral ties 
between non-Western poles of the international system involving states that up 
until recently had been considered as peripheral to the global economy and 
dependent on the advanced capitalist countries for their trade and investment 
(Ehteshami 2004: 133-134). Most notably, an important new relationship is 
developing between the six monarchies of the Persian Gulf–Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman–and the three 
most advanced economies of Pacific Asia–Japan, China, and South Korea.  
With little shared modern economic history, with enormous political and socio-
economic disparities, and separated by great geographical distances, the rapidly 
tightening economic interdependence between the two regions is a recent 
phenomenon that deserves considerable attention. What began as a simple, late 
twentieth century marriage of convenience based on hydrocarbon imports and 
exports has now evolved into a comprehensive, long-term mutual commitment 
that will not only continue to capitalize on the Persian Gulf’s rich energy 
resources and Pacific Asia’s massive energy needs. But it will also seek to 
develop strong non-hydrocarbon bilateral trade, it will facilitate sizeable 
sovereign wealth investments in both directions, and it will provide lucrative 
opportunities for experienced Pacific Asia construction companies, their 
technologies, and–in China’s case–its vast labour force. 
Although this increasingly extensive relationship seems to have had little 
impact on the Persian Gulf’s military security arrangements–which remain 
mostly with the United States, Britain, and France–and although few serious 
attempts have been made by either side to replace or balance these with new 
pan-Asian alliances, this may change soon. Meanwhile, there is compelling 
evidence that the two regions are seeking to strengthen their other non-
economic ties. An abundance of state-level visits, often at much higher levels 
than with Western powers, and a considerable number of cooperative 
agreements, gifts, loans, and other incentives are undoubtedly binding these 
great trade partners ever closer. Moreover, with a number of future 
collaborations including ‘hydrocarbon safekeeping’, renewable energy projects, 
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civilian nuclear power plants, and the building of a twenty-first century ‘Silk 
Road,’ the trajectory of interdependence will continue to accelerate. With a 
growing realization that the Pacific-Asian economies, particularly China, may 
continue to experience higher economic growth credit than the Western 
economies–
thus signifying a global shift in economic weight from the West to the East–the 
Eastwards reorientation of the Persian Gulf monarchies can only intensify. 
Following a brief historical background of relations between the Persian 
Gulf and Pacific Asia, an examination of contemporary hydrocarbon and non-
hydrocarbon trade links will then be made, before turning to the sizeable 
interlinking investments between the nine states involved and to the several 
examples of major construction and labour contracts in the Persian Gulf that 
have already been awarded to Pacific Asian companies. Finally, the efforts to 
boost diplomatic and other relations will be considered, followed by an analysis 
of the many recent efforts to explore innovative future avenues of economic and 
technical cooperation. 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Persian Gulf’s oil trade with the Pacific Asian economies began in the early 
1950s, when Japanese oil companies were scouring the globe for resources to 
fuel Japan’s rapid post-war industrialization programme. Most of the Gulf 
sheikhdoms were off-limits to Japan as they remained part of Britain’s ‘Trucial 
System’–a series of nineteenth-century peace treaties between London and the 
various sheikhs that guaranteed British protection in exchange for exclusive 
political and economic relations (Onley 2007). Saudi Arabia, however, was the 
key exception, with Britain having formally recognized King Abdul-Aziz bin 
Saud’s independence in 1932 and being unable to prevent the US’s Standard Oil 
of California from beginning exploration the following year. In 1953, Japan was 
able to dispatch freely an economic delegation to Saudi Arabia, and the 
following year formal diplomatic relations began. By 1956, Japan’s Arabian Oil 
Company had secured a forty-three-year concession to explore and extract 
Saudi oil,2 and in 1960, production commenced. The lucrative relationship was 
then quickly strengthened by the Saudi ruling family, with its first Minister of 
Defence visiting Tokyo in 1960, and with its third king visiting in 1971. 
In parallel, non-hydrocarbon trade between the Persian Gulf and Japan 
was also beginning to flourish, although its origins were more circuitous. Dubai, 
as one of the Trucial States, had long been exploring inventive ways of 
circumventing Britain’s tight economic controls (Davidson 2008: 19), and in the 
1950s and 1960s, the sheikhdom managed to position itself as the primary re-
export hub for goods destined for India. Following the latter’s independence and 
the attempts of its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to replicate the Soviet 
miracle by using the state to plan and protect the economy, a number of 
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restrictive practices were introduced that effectively prevented India-based 
merchants from meeting domestic demand for their products, especially fabrics. 
In particular, cotton from Japan was in great demand. Dubai played the role of 
an intermediary, its merchants carefully ordering the necessary materials well in 
advance so as to overcome the lengthy five-month shipping time from Japan 
(Buxani 2003: 109–10, 118; Davidson 2008: 70). By the late 1970s, Dubai’s 
trade with Japan had expanded to include electrical goods, with the re-exporting 
of millions of Hitachi personal stereos to the subcontinent (Davidson 2008: 
313), and by 1982 thousands of Japanese television sets were being distributed 
across India and the Persian Gulf (Buxani 2003: 117–19, 121; Davidson 2008: 
71). 
With Britain’s granting of independence to Kuwait in 1961, and with its 
withdrawal from the Trucial States in 1971, Japan’s opportunities for further oil 
concessions and more formal non-hydrocarbon trade expanded to include all the 
Gulf monarchies. Formal diplomatic relations were established with Kuwait in 
1961, and in late 1971 Japan was one of the first countries to recognise the 
newly formed UAE federation. The following year relations were also 
established with Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. The Arabian Oil Company–by this 
stage 80 percent owned by Japan and 20 percent owned by Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait–duly signed concessions in Kuwait in 1961 (CIA 2009), and the 
Japanese Oil Development Company (JODCO) took a stake in an international 
consortium to exploit UAE offshore oil in late 1972 (Abu Dhabi Marine 
Operating Company 2009). 
Although China was also involved in some of the re-export trade in the 
Persian Gulf in the 1950s and 1960s, the volume was much lower than that  of 
Japan and most of the activity took place in Qatar and Kuwait rather than Dubai 
(China, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). With sizeable domestic 
hydrocarbon reserves and less momentum behind its industrialization 
programme, China’s interest in an oil trade with the Persian Gulf was also much 
lower than Japan’s. Moreover, during this period, China’s open support for anti-
imperialist, revolutionary movements stymied most opportunities for closer ties 
with the Gulf’s ruling families (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 201), most of which were 
political beneficiaries of the Trucial System (Davidson 2005: 29–31).3 
Nonetheless, with an eye to the future, the ruler of Kuwait visited China in 1965 
and diplomatic relations were established in 1971. By 1978, circumstances were 
already beginning to change, as the initiation of a series of Chinese economic 
and political reforms–the ‘Four Modernizations’–that aimed to stimulate 
economic growth and support modernization (Evans 1995)
4
 effectively led to 
                                                 
3 Peace treaties signed between Gulf ruling families and the British Empire in the nineteenth century effectively 
guaranteed the former’s security from both foreign aggression and domestic insurgency. 
4 The four modernizations were in the fields of agriculture, industry, technology, and defence.  
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the downgrading of Marxist ideologies in China’s external relations (Yetiv and 
Lu 2007: 201). The door having been opened, Oman immediately established 
diplomatic relations, while the UAE followed suit in 1984, and the following 
year Saudi Arabia held its first official meeting with China on Omani territory. 
Just days after the 1981 formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council–the loose 
organization that was to represent the joint interests of the Gulf monarchies–
China had granted it recognition (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 202). Significantly, in 
1983, China began to import crude oil from Oman as a temporary measure, in 
order to alleviate the problem of transporting its own oil from its northern 
provinces to refineries on the Yangtze River. By 1988, as Chinese demand for 
oil was accelerating rapidly in tandem with its increasing population and 
intensifying industrialization, the Omani arrangement was made permanent 
(Ghafour 2009: 87, 89). By 1990, China’s presence had extended to all the Gulf 
monarchies and embassies being set up in Qatar in 1988, in Bahrain in 1989 and 
in Saudi Arabia in 1990 (China, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). 
Although far less proactive than Japan and China during this period, with 
its major oil companies not being established until the late 1970s and with most 
of its other trade links to the Persian Gulf also developing more recently, South 
Korea was carefully building the foundations of its present strong relationship 
during the 1960s and 1970s. For the most part, it established diplomatic 
relations in the wake of Japan but ahead of China, embassies being set up in 
Saudi Arabia in 1961, in Oman in 1974, in Qatar in 1974, in Bahrain in 1976, in 
Kuwait in 1979, and finally in the UAE in 1980 (South Korea, Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs 2009). 
4. THE HYDROCARBON TRADE 
The hydrocarbon trade undoubtedly remains the central pillar in the 
contemporary relationship between the Gulf monarchies and Pacific Asia, and 
could now be worth as much as US$200 billion per year. At present, the former 
produces a combined total of about 16.6 billion barrels of crude oil per day, 
which is about 19 percent of the global total. The bulk of production takes place 
in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait. The region also produces about 232 
billion cubic metres of natural gas per year, which is about 8 percent of the 
global total. The bulk of production takes place in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. More importantly perhaps, the Gulf monarchies account for 37 percent of 
all known crude oil reserves and 25 percent of all known natural gas reserves 
(CIA 2009: 2007 and 2008 estimates, author’s calculations for totals). Saudi 
Arabia alone accounts for 25 percent of global oil reserves (BP 2008) and Qatar 
15 percent of global gas reserves (US Government 2009). 
At the other extreme, Japan’s current hydrocarbon consumption is 5 
million barrels of oil per day, all of which it has to import, and 100.3 billion 
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cubic metres of gas per year, 95 percent of which it has to import. China’s 
current consumption is 7.9 million barrels of oil per day, 58 percent of which it 
has to import, and 70.5 billion cubic metres of gas per year, 5 percent of which 
it has to import. South Korea’s current consumption is 2.1 million barrels of oil 
per day, all of which it has to import, and 37 billion cubic metres of gas per 
year, 93 percent of which it has to import. Respectively, Japan and China have 
the fourth  and third greatest oil consumption needs in the world, while South 
Korea has now also entered the top ten. Japan has the fifth greatest gas 
consumption needs in the world, while China and South Korea have now moved 
into the top twenty (CIA 2009: 2006–8 estimates, author’s calculations for 
totals) and are likely to catch Japan in the near future. According to the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), although Japan’s 
demand for oil is likely to fall by 15 percent by 2030, China, South Korea and 
other Pacific Asia economies are likely to make up 80 percent of net oil demand 
growth over the same period (The National, 5 August 2009). 
Specifically, Japan currently imports about 1.3 million barrels of oil per 
day from Saudi Arabia, which is over 31 percent of its total oil imports and 
worth close to $33 billion per year for Saudi Arabia (Japan, Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs 2009). This now makes Saudi Arabia the  fifth largest trading 
partner of Japan, while Japan is its second largest trading partner (Saudi 
Gazette, 22 July 2009). In close second place, the UAE now exports 800,000 
barrels of oil per day to Japan (The National, 26 June 2009), with total oil and 
gas exports from Abu Dhabi–the most resource-rich of the UAE’s seven 
constituent emirates–now worth over $47 billion (Japan, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2009). Japan’s hydrocarbon trade with the other Persian Gulf 
monarchies is much less, but still noteworthy; its annual imports from Qatar–
most of which is gas amounts to $17 billion, its imports from Kuwait–most of 
which is oil  amounts to $15 billion, and its imports from Oman and Bahrain 
being $2.6 billion and $0.4 billion respectively (Japan, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2009). 
China’s total hydrocarbon trade with the Gulf monarchies is substantially 
less than Japan’s, mainly due to its domestic gas reserves; nonetheless its oil 
imports have been rising sharply, with $1.5 of imports in 1991, $20 billion in 
2004, and nearly $33.8 billion in 2005 (Ghafour 2009: 83–4). Unsurprisingly, 
during the latter part of this period, China’s Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–5) 
contained its government’s first public acknowledgement that overseas oil 
supplies needed to be secured if China were to enjoy continued economic 
growth and modernization (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 199). In the next few years 
China’s imports are likely to double again, with one Chinese official having 
earlier stated that ‘we need to find oil fast’ (International Herald Tribune, 2 
October 2006) and another commentator recently explaining that ‘with the huge 
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oil and gas imports predicted for the next decade and beyond, China is 
compelled to turn to the Persian Gulf’ (Ghafour 2009: 82–3). Certainly, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that China’s imports will grow to 
over 11 million barrels per day by 2030, more than half of which will have to be 
sourced from the Persian Gulf (Ghafour 2009: 82). 
As with Japan, Saudi Arabia is currently China’s greatest supplier of oil, 
with about 500,000 barrels of oil per day–or 30 percent of China’s total oil 
imports (Ghafour 2009: 83)–being shipped by Aramco to the China Petroleum 
and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). In second place with its hydrocarbon 
exports, is once again the UAE’s Abu Dhabi, with annual oil exports to China 
having risen from $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion over the past five years. Oman, 
courtesy of its aforementioned twenty-five-year history of oil exports to China, 
still remains a significant supplier, its oil trade with Sinopec having risen from 
$1.5 billion in 2002 to $4.4 billion in recent years. Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain’s 
hydrocarbon trade with China has been more modest, but again the trajectory is 
impressive; Kuwait’s supply of 200,000 barrels per day–currently worth $700 
million–being likely to double in the next few years, and Qatar’s gas exports to 
China having risen in value from under $100 million in 1999 to nearly $1 
billion today (China, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). 
For South Korea, the import pattern is similar to its larger neighbours, 
although, much like Japan, it requires from the Persian Gulf substantial imports 
of both oil and gas, given its lack of domestic gas reserves. Saudi Arabia is its 
largest trade partner, supplying about 770,000 barrels of oil per day as part of an 
annual hydrocarbon trade worth $21 billion. The UAE is the second largest 
trade partner, supplying about 430,000 barrels of oil per day as part of an annual 
hydrocarbon trade worth $13 billion (South Korea, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
2009). This makes South Korea the second largest importer of Abu Dhabi’s oil 
after Japan (The National, 5 August 2009). Kuwait’s total oil and gas exports to 
South Korea are also sizeable–worth $8.1 billion, while Qatar’s are worth $7 
billion–almost exclusively gas exports–Oman’s are worth $5.1 billion and 
Bahrain’s $0.3 billion (South Korea, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). 
5. THE NON-HYDROCARBON TRADE 
Non-hydrocarbon trade between the Gulf monarchies and Pacific Asia is on a 
much smaller scale than oil and gas. Nonetheless, as demonstrated, there has 
been an historical precedent for the importing of certain goods from Pacific 
Asia into the Persian Gulf, especially textiles and electrical goods, and as the 
latter region’s per capita wealth accelerated during the oil era, the demand for 
such imports has continued to increase, along with new demands for cars, 
machinery, building materials and many other products associated with the 
region’s oil and construction booms. In total, such imports from Japan, China 
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and South Korea could be worth as much as $32 billion per year.
5
 Importantly, 
there is no longer a complete imbalance of non-hydrocarbon trade between the 
two regions, as some of the export-oriented industries that have been established 
in the Gulf monarchies–mostly in an attempt to diversify oil-dependent 
economies–are now among the world’s leading producers of metals and 
plastics. Their export capacity continues to increase, with most of their future 
surpluses being earmarked for their Pacific Asian customers. 
Japan’s greatest non-hydrocarbon trade partner in the region is the UAE, 
as a function of historic ties to Dubai’s entrepôt trade, Abu Dhabi’s 
commitment to building up heavy, non-hydrocarbon-related industries 
(Davidson 2008: 70–1; 2009: 72–3), and the UAE’s high per capita wealth 
which is now in excess of $40,000 (CIA 2009: 2008 estimate). Their total non-
hydrocarbon trade is now over $11 billion per year (Japan, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2009). Japan’s second largest non-hydrocarbon trade partner in the 
region is Saudi Arabia, the two countries having begun to sign economic and 
technical cooperation agreements as early as 1975. Presently, their non-
hydrocarbon trade has mushroomed and stands at over $5 billion, most of which 
is made up of Saudi imports of Japanese cars, machinery and consumer 
durables, but consisting also of Japanese imports of Saudi metals (Japan, 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). Japan’s non-hydrocarbon trade with 
Kuwait, Qatar and Oman is presently about $2 billion, $1.8 billion and $1.7 
billion respectively, most of which, again, is made up of Japanese exports of 
cars, machinery and consumer durables. Although Bahrain remains Japan’s 
least significant trading partner in the Persian Gulf, it is noteworthy that their 
non-hydrocarbon trade has increased dramatically from $700 million in 2007 
(Japan, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009) to nearly $1.3 billion today, and is 
expected to increase by a further 20 percent over the following year. Overall, 
Japanese non-hydrocarbon trade with the Gulf monarchies is set to increase 
even further as negotiations over a free trade agreement (FTA) between Japan 
and the six monarchies are currently taking place, having commenced in 2006. 
China’s greatest non-hydrocarbon trade partner in the Persian Gulf has 
for many years been Saudi Arabia, a memorandum of understanding on bilateral 
trade having been signed in 1988–as described, two years before China had 
even granted diplomatic recognition to Saudi Arabia. In 1992, a bilateral trade 
conference was staged and in 1996, under the auspices of a GCC–China 
consultative mechanism, annual trade meetings began between the two 
countries, held alternately in Riyadh and Beijing (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 202). 
Today, it is estimated that their total annual non-hydrocarbon trade is worth 
$1.7 billion, mostly made up of Saudi imports of Chinese textiles and 
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machinery (China, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009), making Saudi Arabia 
China’s tenth-largest international export destination (Ghafour 2009: 87). The 
UAE is presently China’s second largest non-hydrocarbon trade partner in the 
Persian Gulf, total trade being estimated at $500 million, again primarily made 
up of imports of Chinese textiles and machinery (China, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2009). In the near future it is likely that China’s trade with the UAE will 
increase massively, and perhaps will soon overtake Japan’s non-hydrocarbon 
trade with that state. Most of this growth is expected to be a result of Dubai’s 
strengthening relationship with China, Dubai Ports World stating in 2008 that 
China was already Dubai’s second largest trade partner after Iran (Arabian 
Business, 31 March 2009). China’s non-hydrocarbon trade with the other 
Persian Gulf monarchies is also growing; annual trade with Kuwait, Oman, 
Bahrain and Qatar being worth $260 million, $60 million, $60 million and $50 
million respectively. These relationships have been facilitated by several 
agreements similar to those made by China with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
As with Japan, China intends to increase its non-hydrocarbon trade with 
the Persian Gulf even further by achieving an FTA with all six of the 
monarchies in the near future. These FTA negotiations began in 2004, following 
a visit by a GCC delegation to China (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 206). Subsequent 
FTA negotiations were held in 2005 and 2006, by which stage agreements had 
been reached on tariff reductions. Although the talks have since stalled due to 
China’s unwillingness to lift certain import restrictions on a number of non-
hydrocarbon goods from the Persian Gulf, in early 2009, the concept of an FTA 
was reinvigorated by the president of China, and in summer 2009,  the GCC 
reciprocated China’s sentiments by publishing a White Paper entitled 
‘Economic relations between GCC member states and the People’s Republic of 
China’, which similarly urged the swift conclusion of FTA negotiations (China 
Daily, 30 January 2004; People’s Daily, 12 February 2009; Gulf Cooperation 
Council Secretariat 2009). More recently, the proposed FTA seems to have 
gathered further pace. 
South Korea’s non-hydrocarbon trade with the Persian Gulf is more 
modest, although as with Japan and China, its relationship is strengthening. The 
Persian Gulf monarchies having collectively become South Korea’s second 
largest export destination after China (Zawya Dow Jones, 8 March 2009), most 
of the trade being made up of cars, rubber parts and textiles. Individually, South 
Korea’s non-hydrocarbon trade with Saudi Arabia is about $3 billion, the UAE 
$2.9 billion, Qatar $800 million, Kuwait $700 million, Oman $300 million and 
Bahrain $100 million. South Korea has not yet advanced as far as Japan and 
China with a Persian Gulf FTA; however negotiations did begin in summer 
2008, a second round being held in spring 2009 (Kuwait Times, 8 March 2009), 
and they have continued since. 
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6. INVESTMENTS AND JOINT VENTURES 
Alongside the booming hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon trades, the 
relationship between the Gulf monarchies and Pacific Asia is being greatly 
enhanced by a substantial flow of investments between the two regions. 
Significantly, these investments are being made in both directions and at all 
levels, and they include massive sovereign wealth investments. Although the 
majority are still connected to the oil and gas sectors, there is strong evidence 
that an increasingly diverse range of non-hydrocarbon joint ventures is also 
being established. In the short term, these opportunities are providing the Gulf 
monarchies with a realistic alternative to the mature Western economies for 
their overseas investments. Such an alternative was viewed as being particularly 
necessary following the 11
 
September, 2001, attacks, after which many Western 
governments and companies did little to disguise their distrust of Gulf sovereign 
wealth funds, many arguing that the funds were not merely commercial and that 
power politics could be involved.  
Japan is presently the largest foreign investor in Saudi Arabia, with over 
$11 billion of active investments being distributed among twenty-four different 
projects, including sixteen industrial projects and eight service-sector projects 
(Saudi Gazette, 22 July 2009). In the other direction, Saudi Arabia’s Aramco 
now holds a 15 percent stake in Japan’s fifth largest oil company, Showa Shell 
Sekiyu. Additionally, in summer 2009,  the two countries entered into a $1 
billion joint venture, when the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and 
Japan’s Mitsubishi Rayon agreed to build an acrylics factory in Saudi Arabia, 
Mitsubishi holding the majority stake. In the UAE, Abu Dhabi’s third largest 
sovereign wealth fund, the International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC), 
has recently sought a $5 billion package from Japan’s Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group and the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation. This in turn will allow 
these Japanese banks to have an interest in some of IPIC’s overseas investments 
(Associated Press, 2 August 2009). In the other direction, IPIC has now taken a 
20 percent stake in Japan’s Cosmo Oil Company, which continues to hold a 
major Abu Dhabi offshore oil concession, thus strengthening further Japan–
UAE interdependence.  
In early 2005, the Chinese Ministry for Commerce revealed that Chinese 
investments in the Gulf monarchies had already reached $5 billion, while Gulf 
investments in China totalled $700 million (Ghafour 2009: 87). With a flurry of 
further investments and joint ventures since that announcement, these figures 
have since mushroomed, and will soon overtake even Japan’s interests in the 
region. In particular, China has sought investments to help build up its oil-
refining industries, in which the Persian Gulf economies have sought to have a 
dominant presence (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 205). At present China’s greatest 
investment partner from the Persian Gulf is Kuwait, a relationship which 
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strengthened greatly following the setting up of a $9 billion joint venture 
between the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and Sinopec in 2005 (Associated 
Press, 26 June 2009). In 2006, this deal was followed by the Kuwait Investment 
Authority (KIA) buying over $700 million in shares in the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, thereby making Kuwait one of the biggest investors 
in one of China’s first major public offerings. China may soon become heavily 
involved in Kuwaiti projects, Sinopec currently having a sizeable stake in an 
international consortium that is bidding for an $8 billion infrastructural 
programme (Ghafour 2009: 89). The most innovative aspect of the investments 
between the two countries has been the establishment of the Kuwait–China 
Investment Company (KCIC) in 2005. Set up by the Kuwait government, the 
KCIC is 15 percent owned by KIA and has a capital base of about $350 million, 
about half of which is held in cash (Financial Times, 10 July 2009). 
As well as Kuwait, China is also heavily involved with Saudi Arabia, 
Aramco having taken a 25 percent stake in a major joint venture with Sinopec in 
2001. In the near future another joint venture between the two companies may 
take place, but this time with Aramco taking the majority stake. This could lead 
to the building of the largest oil refinery in China, and may require as much as 
$6 billion to complete. Similarly, SABIC has already helped to initiate three 
petrochemicals projects in China as part of its ‘China Plan’, which aims to 
facilitate mutual investments between the two countries, support China’s 
economic development and satisfy its increasing demand as one of its premier 
suppliers (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 207–8). In the other direction, Sinopec has 
recently embarked on yet another joint venture with Aramco, taking an 80 
percent, $300 million stake in a new oil and gas exploration company in Saudi 
Arabia (Ghafour 2009: 87–8). Elsewhere in the Persian Gulf, Qatar has recently 
followed Kuwait’s lead and has signalled its intent to purchase $200 million in 
shares in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Ghafour 2009: 87). 
And in summer 2009, it was announced that Qatar Petroleum would enter into a 
joint venture with PetroChina worth $12 billion. The UAE, and more 
specifically Dubai, is also investing in China, with its government-owned Dubai 
Ports World parastatal now operating seven terminals in China andthree of them 
in Hong Kong.  
7. CONSTRUCTION AND LABOUR CONTRACTS 
For some years, construction and labour companies in the Pacific Asia countries 
have been winning contracts in the Persian Gulf, the China National Petroleum 
Company (CNPC) having supplied labourers for projects in Kuwait as early as 
1983 (Ghafour 2009: 87–9; Yetiv and Lu 2007: 203), and a number of other 
Chinese companies having supplied labourers for tourism and real-estate 
projects in Dubai for several years. However, very recently a large number of 
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major contracts have been awarded to Japanese, Chinese and South Korean 
companies both to build and supply labour for multi-billion dollar projects in 
the Persian Gulf. Significantly, in many cases these companies have competed 
successfully against Arab and Western companies that have had a much longer 
history of winning contracts in the region and have usually sourced their labour 
from South Asia. Undoubtedly, these new contracts serve to solidify further the 
economic interdependence between the two regions while also taking advantage 
of the Pacific Asian companies’ experience, technologies and access to 
abundant labour. 
Of the three principal Pacific Asian countries, it has been South Korea 
that has made the greatest inroads into the Gulf monarchies’ construction sector. 
In the UAE, three out of five new gas facilities in Abu Dhabi’s Habshan region, 
operated by Abu Dhabi Gas Industries (GASCO), are being constructed by 
South Korean companies. Hyundai Engineering and Construction, GS 
Engineering and Hyundai Heavy Industries won their contracts in 2009, 
totalling $4.9 billion. Remarkably, Hyundai Engineering and Construction is 
already believed to be working on nine other projects in the UAE and has 
recently completed the construction of new gas processing facilities in Saudi 
Arabia’s Khurais field. Elsewhere in Saudi Arabia, the company won a $1.9 
billion contract in late 2008 to build further gas processing facilities in the 
Karan field, on behalf of Aramco. And three other major South Korean 
companies won a combined $2.8 billion contract to build a new refinery and 
petrochemicals plant in Saudi Arabia (Korea Herald, 17 July 2009). 
8. DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY 
Surprisingly, for many observers, there is still no obvious security dimension to 
the increasingly interdependent relationship between the Gulf monarchies and 
Pacific Asia. All the former are widely considered to be vulnerable, given their 
rich energy resources, small national populations, and close proximity to major 
conflicts and other potential threats. Moreover, their reliance on a Western 
security umbrella is undoubtedly problematic, given the strained relations 
between the Arab world and the US, not least over the Arab–Israeli conflict, but 
also following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
Equally it would seem to make sense for the Pacific Asian countries to seek a 
more active role in the security arrangements and defensive shields of their 
primary energy suppliers.  
Part of the explanation is that the Gulf monarchies do not yet see a 
reliable alternative to the West. For all its shortcomings, it was a Western-led 
alliance that liberated Kuwait in 1991, and it is the Western presence that has 
been credited with safeguarding the Gulf from Iraqi or Iranian belligerence in 
the past.  As such, with a few exceptions, notably a modest arms trade with 
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China (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2007), almost all of the Gulf monarchies’ arms 
imports have been sourced from western manufacturers. Moreover, although 
there has been an appreciable increase in China’s naval presence in the region–
in part due to anti-pirate operations in the nearby Gulf of Aden–there is little 
projection of Pacific Asian military power in the Persian Gulf itself. Instead 
there remain a number of well-entrenched US military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain 
and Qatar, a British base in Oman and a new French base was even opened in 
Abu Dhabi in spring 2009. Some commentators have argued that the same lack 
of enthusiasm for a security relationship between the two regions applies in 
reverse: although it is not ideal that the US dominates the Persian Gulf, the 
Pacific Asian countries nonetheless see little alternative to Western-provided 
security, given that the thousands of miles of shipping lanes between themselves 
and their hydrocarbon suppliers would be difficult and expensive to protect. 
Thus far, it has remained more practical and cost effective to rely on 
experienced Western navies, which have already invested in a multi-billion 
capability for this purpose and enjoy access to a network of maritime bases in 
allied states (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 200–1). 
Another component of the explanation is simply lingering distrust, 
despite all the aforementioned economic linkages and converging histories. This 
is not so much related to Japan or South Korea, which are effectively neutral 
military powers, but rather to China, which has repeatedly created difficulties 
for a stronger security relationship. For many of the older generation of Omanis, 
including their present ruler, it is still difficult to forget that China helped to 
sponsor the rebellion in Oman’s Dhofar province in the 1960s and 1970s, while 
Britain played a key role in suppressing the rebels (Calabrese 1990: 867; 
Ghafour 2009: 89, 91). In the mid-1980s, it appeared that China’s role in the 
region would increase, as Saudi Arabia began to buy Chinese CSS–2 East Wind 
missiles. However, Saudi Arabia was unwilling to go further and purchase 
Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles, preferring to keep sourcing its 
ordinance from the US. Most seriously, in 1990, China was unwilling to 
condemn openly Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and following Kuwait’s purchase of 
nearly $300 million of Chinese howitzers in the mid-1990s, a Kuwaiti official 
later claimed that his government had been pressured into the deal as China was 
threatening to withdraw its support for future UN sanctions against Iraq 
(Ghafour 2009: 88–9, 91; Yetiv and Lu 2007: 211). Tellingly, China’s Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs is currently attempting to rewrite this troubled period of 
history with Kuwait and its neighbours by stating that ‘during the Gulf crisis in 
1990, China resolutely opposed Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait and 
demanded that Iraq should withdraw its troops from Kuwait and restore and 
respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait … both 
countries share identical or similar views on many major international and 
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regional issues, constantly rendering sympathy and support to each other’ 
(China, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). 
Regardless of the various explanations, the present reality is that the Gulf 
monarchies and their great Pacific Asian trade and investment partners do not 
yet have a meaningful security relationship. However, this is in no way 
jeopardizing their current and future closeness, with both clusters of countries 
now going to considerable lengths to improve other, non-economic aspects of 
their interdependency. Indeed, there now appears to be a tacit understanding 
from both parties that their relationship simply need not contain a military 
security component, at least for the time being. High-level diplomatic visits 
have, in particular, become central to the strategies of both regions. While 
economic and trade matters are certainly discussed at these events, they are, 
nonetheless, also perceived as valuable opportunities for heads of state and their 
ministers to meet their counterparts and consider a range of other matters. Often 
substantial gifts or interest-free loans are granted during these meetings, clearly 
in an effort to build more sturdy political and cultural understandings, and they 
undoubtedly generate further goodwill. In recent years the frequency of these 
visits has greatly intensified, and the seniority of the visitors–especially from 
the Gulf monarchies travelling to Pacific Asia–is significantly high, and likely 
to now be higher on average than the seniority of visitors dispatched to Western 
capitals. 
9. FUTURE INITIATIVES AND COLLABORATIONS 
With the noted exception of military security arrangements, the relationship 
between the Gulf monarchies and the three principal Pacific Asian economies 
will continue to strengthen and broaden for the foreseeable future, provided that 
the former remain able to balance their existing relationships with the Western 
powers and Pacific Asia, especially China (Moran and Russell 2008). Thus far, 
such geopolitical competition would seem to have been avoided, given the 
primary emphasis on bilateral economic linkages, which for the most part have 
had little direct impact on the Gulf monarchies’ dealings with the West. Indeed, 
as this chapter has demonstrated, the hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon trade 
between the two regions has been rapidly rising in volume and value, and is 
projected to continue to do so. Similarly, it has been shown that the flow of 
bilateral investments between the two regions continue to rise, and a substantial 
number of construction and labour contracts are being signed with ever greater 
frequency. These trajectories are all being enhanced by improving non-
economic ties, especially at the diplomatic level, and, as discussed, it is likely 
that these linkages will grow even tighter in the near future. Furthermore, the 
relationship will also be enhanced by several new initiatives and collaborations 
between the two regions, all of which augment existing economic bonds, while 
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some have implications for future non-military security arrangements, and 
others are highly symbolic of this twenty-first-century partnership. 
In 2010, Abu Dhabi’s national oil company began using one of Nippon’s 
existing reserve bases in Kagoshima in southern Japan as a crude oil storage 
depot. This agreement has already provided the UAE with an alternative outlet 
for its crude oil sales, not only to Japan and its neighbours, but the entire East 
Asia region. Such an outlet would prove vital if the Strait of Hormuz–the 
entrance to the Persian Gulf–was closed in the event of an emergency. From 
Japan’s perspective the agreement is equally beneficial, as it provides Japan 
with direct access and a pre-emptive right to purchase crude oil in such an 
emergency. Tellingly, ADNOC’s spokesperson stated that the arrangement 
would ‘contribute to enhancing Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Asian markets 
generally and Japan particularly, and guarantee the flow of crude oil supplies to 
these markets in emergencies’ (The National, 26 June 2009). 
The future energy sector is another likely area of collaboration, with 
countries from both regions actively seeking to set up solar and nuclear joint 
ventures. Japan’s Showa Shell Sekiyu announced that it was considering 
operating solar power plants in Saudi Arabia in cooperation with Aramco, 
which, as described, is now one of its principal shareholders. Showa intends to 
build small pilot plants in Saudi Arabia to test its technologies, and should these 
prove successful then a joint venture with Aramco may be set up (Associated 
Press, 25 June 2009). With the UAE committed to a path of diversifying its 
energy sources and building up a civilian nuclear programme based on imported 
technologies from the US, its government has repeatedly turned to Japan and 
South Korea for advice and assistance. In early 2009, the UAE signed a nuclear 
cooperation memorandum of understanding with Japan, and in summer 2009, 
the UAE signed a similar agreement with South Korea. A twenty-strong UAE 
delegation was promptly sent to South Korea–at the invitation of the Korea 
Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO)–to survey its nuclear facilities, and in late 
2009, a KEPCO-led consortium outbid two other international consortia to win 
a $20 billion contract to construct the UAE’s first three nuclear plants. 
Perhaps most emblematic of the many new developments that will 
strengthen the link between Pacific Asia and the Gulf monarchies in the near 
future is China’s attempt to reconstruct the old Karakoram Highway. This will 
effectively connect China to the Persian Gulf by a land route that follows the 
same path as the ancient Silk Road. To do so, China will build the world’s 
highest altitude motorway in cooperation with the Pakistani government, which 
will not only involve a massive investment and working in difficult terrain, but 
will even require the pacifying of local tribes in remote areas beyond the control 
of the Beijing and Islamabad governments (The National, 6 August 2009). On 
completion, this new highway will connect with deep-water ports in Pakistan, 
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most notably the port at Gwadar, in Baluchistan, which has direct access to the 
Gulf of Oman and lies just 250 miles from the entrance to the Persian Gulf. 
China has already invested $200 million in Gwadar, the port having first opened 
in 2005 with three berths; China intends it to expand soon to ten berths with a 
new bulk-cargo terminal (Ghafour 2009: 83). 
10. CONCLUSION 
By the end of the twentieth century, with rapidly accelerating demand from 
increasingly resource-scarce China and South Korea, and sustained demand 
from Japan, the Pacific Asian economies had all become heavily dependent on 
oil and gas imports, with most being sourced from the Persian Gulf monarchies.  
Now, more than ever, this massive and lucrative hydrocarbon trade represents 
the central pillar in the strengthening relationship between the two regions and, 
as demonstrated, is presently worth hundreds of billions of dollars per annum.  
In the near future it is likely this trade will amount to trillions of dollars per 
annum. Significantly, few efforts are being made by either side to disguise their 
increasing dependency on the other, with the bulk of future Gulf hydrocarbon 
exporting capacity being earmarked for Pacific Asian buyers. This contrasts 
markedly with other hydrocarbon importing economies, especially in the West, 
where most often an emphasis is placed on diversifying supplies wherever 
possible. Although on a much smaller scale than the oil and gas trade, it is also 
important to note how rapidly the non-hydrocarbon trade between the two 
regions is also growing. In something of a twenty-first century reincarnation of 
the ancient Silk Road, the Gulf monarchies are importing ever-increasing 
quantities of textiles, machinery, automobiles, and electrical products from the 
Pacific Asian economies, while in the other direction, the Gulf states have 
augmented their hydrocarbon exports by selling increasing volumes of metals, 
plastics, and petrochemicals. With a host of new initiatives from all of the 
governments and business communities concerned, together with considerable 
relaxations on visa requirements and other erstwhile restrictions, it is becoming 
much easier than before for merchants from both regions to travel and take their 
business from one side of Asia to the other. 
In parallel to these intensifying trade links, the relationship between the 
Gulf monarchies and the Pacific Asian economies is being strengthened even 
further by a massive flow of investments. These investments are in both 
directions and at all levels, with most being managed by giant government-
backed sovereign wealth funds. Although the bulk of these investments are still 
associated with the hydrocarbon industry, there are, however, strong signs that 
an increasingly diverse range of non-hydrocarbon joint ventures are also being 
pursued.  Such opportunities are finally providing the Gulf monarchies with a 
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realistic and more hospitable alternative to the more mature Western economies 
for their overseas investments and interests.   
Although Pacific Asian construction companies have been winning 
contracts in the Persian Gulf for some time, it is significant that over the last 
few years there has been a marked increase in their success. Many of the most 
recent contracts have been to both build and supply the labour for multi-billion 
dollar developments and, significantly, in many cases the successful Japanese, 
Chinese, and South Korean companies have had to compete against Arab and 
Western companies.  Even though Chinese and other Pacific Asian labour often 
comes at a slightly higher cost than labour from India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh, 
it is increasingly viewed as less problematic by the governments in the Persian 
Gulf monarchies, as the presence of thousands of non-Muslim and non-Arabic 
speaking Pacific Asian labourers is not thought to pose a significant security 
threat to these states. 
Despite these intensifying connections between the two regions, a 
meaningful security arrangement has yet to develop, despite the obvious 
advantages to both the Gulf monarchies–which have to balance their reliance on 
Western support with often contradictory domestic sentiments; and the Pacific 
Asian economies–which need to secure their energy supply routes. If anything, 
the Western powers have increased their military presence in the Persian Gulf in 
recent years, with new bases being established and ever-increasing sales of 
sophisticated weaponry to their most demanding customers. In part, this has 
been due to a history of distrust, with the Gulf monarchies preferring to seek 
support from the same reliable protectors that preserved their integrity during 
the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s and orchestrated the liberation of Kuwait in 
1991. Moreover, there is undoubtedly a feeling on both sides that their 
increasing economic interdependency does not yet require a security dimension 
as long as the Western powers continue to guarantee–and thereby subsidize–the 
safety of their shipping routes and supply lines. However, there are a number of 
recent indicators that the Pacific Asian states, especially China and to a lesser 
extent Japan, are beginning to assume a more active role in the broader region's 
security environment. 
Without a strong security component to their relationship, the Gulf 
monarchies and the Pacific Asian economies have all gone to considerable 
lengths to shore up a number of other, non-economic aspects of their 
interdependency. In particular, there has been a strong focus on aid-giving, 
grants, and other donations, even if only for symbolic purposes. Moreover, there 
has been a marked increase in the frequency and seniority of diplomatic visits.  
While economic and trade matters remain at the heart of these meetings, a broad 
range of other issues are discussed  and strong efforts are being made to 
generate the most effective cultural and educational linkages. Furthermore, the 
 17 
increasingly interdependent and multi-dimensional relationship between the two 
regions is also being enhanced by several new initiatives and collaborations 
which will take shape over the next few years. These include innovative 
hydrocarbon storage projects, investments in renewable energies, further 
improvements to pan-Asian physical trade infrastructure, and the construction 
and technology transfer of civilian nuclear power from Pacific Asia to the Gulf 
monarchies. All of these developments will augment existing economic bonds, 
while some may even have an impact on future security arrangements. 
The intensifying connection between the two regions also has several 
broader implications. The lack of significant military collaboration has certainly 
allowed the US and other Western powers to remain in their role as the ultimate 
protectors of the Persian Gulf and the guarantors of the international oil 
industry’s most strategic shipping lanes. This has kept to a minimum any 
tension between the US and China, with the latter regarded by most observers as 
being the most militaristic of the Pacific Asia states. Given timethis will likely 
change, as the Pacific Asia states gradually seek greater influence over their 
primary energy suppliers. Moreover, the many other linkages between the Gulf 
monarchies and Pacific Asia described in this chapter, including the various 
economic and diplomatic ties, and perhaps especially the raft of new initiatives 
and collaborations, will undoubtedly prompt the US and other powers to pay 
more attention to this new pan-Asian relationship.  Such increased attention, if 
mishandled and too heavy-handed, may in turn reduce trust between the Gulf 
monarchies and their Western allies and partners, thus providing a fresh wave of 
opportunities for Pacific Asian governments and companies to win lucrative 
contracts and thus increase their influence even further.   
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